Considering the cooperative behavior in a single species, the evolution time of ( ) x t of the players are governed by ( ) ( )
we can obtain two boundary equilibrium points, 0 0 x = and 1 1 x = , and the inner x . The inner equilibrium point * 1
x is stable and the other inner equilibrium point * 2
x is unstable (see fig.2c and 2d in main text).
Appendix B
A collective reward model within a single species was proposed by Ji et al. (2010) .
The payoffs of the cooperator and the defector are given by, respectively ( )
and
is the additional reward, when the work is completed sooner as a result of more cooperators sharing the work, all involved players could enjoy the fruit of the joint effort earlier and thus they should all receive an additional reward, and w represents the intensity of reward. In this game, cooperation can be enhanced by increasing the reward-to-benefit ratio w b . For small group size, a stable state with full of cooperation ( 1 x = ) should emerge when the intensity of reward exceeds a certain threshold 1 .
We consider a game played between species in mutualisms, and assume that dominant species or hosts (species 1) will pay some costs so as to bring a reward
to each individual of its partners (species 2) because of the cooperative behavior. The costs of reward originate usually from compulsory contributions made by all participants in dominant species 1. As a result, we assume that each individual of species 1 will gain less reward,
gives an estimate of the size of the reward as a function of the number of cooperators i j + in the interacting group. The parameter w represents the intensity of the reward, and the parameter r represents the discount of reward for the dominant species 1. In addition, we assume the mutualistic benefit is provided only if the number of cooperators in the species 1 and 2 both exceed one (i.e., 1 i ≥ and 1 j ≥ ), or otherwise, none benefit can be produced and each cooperators will pay a maximum cost 1
. Under these assumptions, the N-player evolutionary snowdrift game model with collective reward mechanism between species can be given by ( ) ( ) 
Appendix C
The evolution time of ( ) x t and ( ) y t of the two species are governed by the following replicator dynamic equations:
i.e.
( )(
From equation (s9), we can obtain four boundary equilibrium points denoted as 
, ,
where ( ) 
, 1 
By analyzing the property of the matrices' eigenvalues, produced by the linearization of the replicator dynamics (s9) at the equilibrium points, we find that the equilibrium
